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The Diamond Sutra is one of the best-known and most frequently interpreted 
of the Mahayana sutras. It is an accessible non-esoteric discourse which at the 
same time seems to controvert exact or determinate meanings. It persistently 
draws attention to its own contradictory status, to its authority to make as­
sertions which turn out to be no assertions at all,1 openly displaying those 
oppositions upon which the conceptual order of language is based, insistently 
reminding the reader of its existence as text, as mere words, verbal notations, 
figures of speech. It employs a functional rhetoric to dissuade the reader from 
being seduced by the attractions of rhetoric (the raft metaphor is perhaps the 
locus classicus'. it is a helpful figure of speech, yet must be seen to be merely 
so). It questions those verbal codes through which we structure our empirical 
perception of the world, challenging the reader to see them as codes, as text. 
Thus the Sutra serves less to ‘express the inexpressible’ than to ‘unexpress the 
expressible’,2 to drive a wedge between language and our common-sense as­
sumptions about its transparency on to a ‘real world’ of objects and essences. 
At the same time it proposes that this wedge or ‘gap’ is itself the illusory con­
sequence of our mistaking words for qualities or things.
1 Edward Conze, The Large Sutra on Perfect Wisdom (Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 1975), p. 1. Conze characterizes the assertions of the Large Sutra in 
this manner.
2 See Roland Barthes, Critical Essays, trans. Richard Howard (Evanston: North­
western University Press, 1972), p. xvii where Barthes assigns this purpose to the ‘task 
of art’.
The Sutra is a self-deconstructive text in so far as it underscores both its own 
status as a discursive phenomenon and the contradictions involved in mistaking 
its declarations for either literal or metaphorical truth. In decoding its own 
procedures it enacts that detachment from codes which it seeks to induce in the 
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reader. Thus in presenting language as an instrument of deception it seeks to 
unmask that deception and the motives which help to perpetuate it (the kinds 
of desire which attachment to language induces, for adaptation, settled meanings, 
stable identity, etc.). If language functions to structure a homogeneous ‘self’ and 
a ‘world’, then the Sutra functions to expose these two types of mental construct 
as contingent and arbitrary.
I have chosen to discuss this particular Sutra mainly for reasons of con­
venience. It is well-known; it is short; it is concerned among other things with 
its own status as text; and its fragmentary, repetitive form makes it particularly 
amenable to the kind of structural analysis which makes up the first section of 
the present essay. The second and third deal with the Sutra’s devices for sub­
verting the two central illusions upon which assumptions about the realistic func­
tions of language are based: the referential illusion, the belief in the identity 
of the signified (concept) and the referent (extra-linguistic entity), in that what 
one names is as one names it; the semantic illusion, the belief in the natural 
relation between signifier (word-sound) and signified, and thus in the capacity 
of language to establish fixed meanings and, by extension, a stable ego and a 
homogeneous world-view.3 Thus my concern is less with the ‘what’ (the message) 
than with the ‘how’ of the Sutra, the manner through which its structural and 
rhetorical strategies contribute fundamentally to the articulation of its basic 
doctrines and outlook.
3 I have borrowed this neat formulation of the relationship between elements in the 
semiotic triangle (signifier, signified, referent) from Gerard Genette, Figures of Literary 
Discourse (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), p. 249.
4 Edward Conze, Buddhist Wisdom Books (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1958), 
pp. 17, 24, 29, 42, 51-52. All subsequent quotations from The Diamond Sutra, unless 
where otherwise stated, are from this edition.
1. The Structural Illusion
We can start by juxtaposing two conclusions about the structure of the Sutra 
by two distinguished commentators on it: Edward Conze and Han Shan (d. 
1623). Noting that to the casual reader the Sutra must appear as ‘a jumble of 
disjointed pieces’ strung together at random, Conze then proceeds to posit 
thematic connections in the opening sections which possess (at best) a weak 
integrative potential. Thus sections 3-5 deal with the career of a Bodhisattva; 
6-8 with the Buddha’s ‘Dharmabody’, while 9-12 play the ‘same tune once 
again, but with some variations . . .’. After the first ending, however, Conze 
views the second part as ‘no more than a chance medley of stray sayings’ whose 
‘frequent repetitions and violent transitions’ lead him (and other scholars) to 
conjecture that the scribes misplaced some of the palm leaves.4 Thus the Sutra 
115
DOHERTY
seems to frustrate Conze’s search for an organizing principle which in turn 
would help him to discover an architectonic unity, a structural consonance or 
harmony (note the musical metaphors) which would integrate all the parts. 
Concomitantly he is led to posit an original cohesiveness or wholeness which is 
now lost or displaced.
Han Shan, by contrast, believes in the genuine cohesiveness of the Sutra and 
decodes it in terms of a unified design. He does so in three ways: first by accept­
ing Vasubandhu’s as the sole authoritative commentary (in effect legislating 
against further exegesis), thus fixing as he puts it the ‘exact meaning’ of the 
Sutra; then by positing a hidden plot for the Sutra, an occulted system of 
references to which the commentary alone holds the key; and finally, as a 
consequence of both these assumptions, by locating a sequential development, 
the soteriological ‘narrative’ of Subhuti’s (twenty-seven) doubts, synthesized 
in a graded series of revelations, culminating in ‘the true voidness of Prajna’.5 
In so doing Han Shan ‘tames’ the structure of the Sutra, subjugating its asym­
metries, its disjunctions, its discontinuities and its repetitions to accord with the 
regularities of an occulted design.
5 Lu K’uan Yu (Charles Luk), Ch’an and Zen Teaching, Series One (London: Rider
& Company, 1975), pp. 156, 160-206.
6 Critical Essays, p. 173.
7 See The Perfection of Wisdom in Eight Thousand Lines as quoted in Chris Gudmun- 
sen, Wittgenstein and Buddhism (London: The Macmillan Press, 1977), p. 49.
Whatever their differences both commentators are united in their desire to 
weld the heterogeneous elements in the Sutra into a unified whole. For Conze 
this is a possibility beyond hope of realization; for Han Shan it is a task which 
Vasubandhu’s commentary has once-for-all accomplished. Both men take for 
granted the necessity of positing a totalizing design which would bracket the 
apparently fortuitous or random elements in its construction. It is precisely 
this hidden assumption which makes it impossible for either commentator to 
contemplate the Sutra as a compilation, an assemblage of fragments.
Barthes once spoke of the horror vacui implicit in conceptions of the Book 
as an object ‘which connects, develops, runs, andj?ow.s’;6 in these terms the 
Sutra embraces the structural ‘void’, and might be most accurately conceived 
of as an open network or web momentarily assembled by the intentional activity 
of reading. Indeed apart from the traditional opening and closing sections it 
violates expectations of a progressive or developing structure (in this sense it 
is at one with the ‘Perfect Wisdom’ where ‘one cannot apprehend the beginning, 
middle or end of form’7). The manner in which the individual sections interrelate 
with each other has a significant bearing on the doctrines articulated; they 
reflect each other like alternate sides of a coin. It is precisely this complicity 
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between this ‘no-structure’ and teaching that I want to explore at this point.
Perhaps the most striking structural aspect of the Sutra is that repetition of 
units8 for which there is no apparent formal or logical justification (Conze, for 
example, suspends his commentary on the second part of the Sutra on the grounds 
that this excessive repetition leaves him with nothing to say). These units dis­
play no development but are distributed irregularly throughout the text. They 
operate less as self-identical entities than as reciprocal units placed in active 
relation to all other units; they vary from each other but do not evolve. The fact 
that no one repetition is completely identical with another highlights its status 
as a mental construction, its lack of self-subsistency reinforced by that which it 
shares with all other units in the series. Thus the Sutra produces new combina­
tions. It operates as a ‘mobilization of recurrent units’,9 a shifting network of 
forms and relations which replicates the purely differential status of the verbal 
elements which constitute it. As a consequence no single unit is foregrounded 
and thus given absolute value; rather they exist co-dependently. The semantic 
norm of the Sutra is primarily a contextual one. It frustrates the search for centres 
of reference or for consistent wholes.
8 What the term ‘unit’ entails will become clear in the course of the subsequent dis­
cussion. Sections are denoted by S, followed by the number.
9 Barthes, Critical Essays, p. 182.
10 Quoted from Gudmunsen, p. 73. I should add at this point that throughout the 
present essay I assume an ‘ideal reader’ for the Sutra, one who is aware of its conven­
tions and codes, and who submits to the kind of transformation which a reading of it 
may elicit.
Thus the reader is situated, less in hermeneutic pursuit of a core code or 
‘truth’, than as the locus of those mutating perspectives which make up the text. 
He/she is teased out of his conventional assumption of a necessary relation be­
tween textual form and finalized structures in the same manner (as we shall see) 
as of that between word-sign and object or sound-image and concept. Alter­
natively one might say that the demand on the reader is less to organize the ideas 
of the Sutra and thus integrate them into an overall system than to circulate 
them in recurrent configurations, in a kaleidoscope of shifting formations and 
patterns. Such a demand precludes the sedimentation of a centre of observation 
in the reader (unified self) or the positing of loci of central significance in the 
Sutra (unified text) (like the Bodhisattvas of the Prajnaparamita Sutra the reader 
is left ground-less, ‘without a place to stand on’10). It is in the light of this 
conception of structure as no-structure that the quest for totalizations, whether 
of form or of content, undermines the soteriological effects of the discontinuous 
repetitive elements in the Sutra. To give these generalities a more concrete founda­
tion it may be helpful to trace the course of two of these units as they circulate 
throughout the textual network.
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The unit comprising ‘the notion of a self or of a being ... or of a living soul 
or of a person’, which is repeated at least seven times, occurs first in S3 in the 
context of a Bodhisattva who is not to be called a Bodhisattva should he cherish 
such a notion. Thereafter it is distributed and transposed throughout the Sutra, 
in shifting perspectives, entering into new contextual relations and combinations. 
Diffused among a variety of situations and time-scales it is recontextualized in 
relation to Bodhisattvas of some future period in whom no perception of a self 
takes place (S6); to a Streamwinner’s or Arhat’s awareness of his attainment 
which would imply such a perception (S9); to beings of the last epoch who will 
be free from such a perception (S14); to a Bodhisattva’s notion of beings to be 
liberated which would imply such a perception (SI7); to the Tathagata’s notion 
of all the beings he has liberated in the past which would imply such a perception 
(S25); to the Tathagata’s teaching that such a view of self is a no-view so that 
the term may be freely employed as a figure of speech (S31). Thus each repetition 
has a prospective, a retrospective and a co-existent relation with all of the others; 
each modifies the others and is modified by them in its turn.
What is the effect of this distribution? For one thing it undermines the auton­
omy of each individual repetition, prizing it away from its particularized context, 
highlighting both its status as a mental construction and its ‘dependent co­
origination’ with the other repetitions. For another it precludes the reader’s 
attachment to any one formulation as an absolute content, the textual flux enact­
ing precisely that detachment from particular notations or contexts that it seeks 
to induce in the reader. It frustrates the construction of a unified (readerly) 
site, the natural equation of a unified structure with a unified self.
Or take a second unit, the one which first appears in S7: ‘This dharma which 
the Tathagata has fully known or demonstrated—it cannot be grasped, it cannot 
be talked about, it is neither a dharma nor a no-dharma’. Here the notion of the 
inaccessibility of the dharma to the discursive structures of language is re­
contextualized in terms of the illusion of bestowing existence on objects or es­
sences through acts of nomination. Thus it occurs in S13 as the world-system 
which may be called a ‘world-system’ because no such system exists; in S14 in 
relation to those beings who will not be ‘frightened or terrified’ when they realize 
that the ‘highest perfection’ is merely called the ‘highest perfection’; in SI8 in 
the context of all the beings of the universe who are known through trends of 
thought which are merely called ‘trends of thought’; on through a complex 
network of contexts (which it is unnecessary to record here) from S19 to S30 
in which the notion of seizing on ‘the world-system of 1,000 million worlds’ is 
viewed as a matter of ‘linguistic convention, a verbal expression without factual 
content’.
Here the effect is to dislocate the verbal sign from its conventional meaning 
(the reader is made to perceive that there is no necessary relation between them) 
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and to situate individual words (or expressions) as arbitrary counters in an open- 
ended interrelational game. Through its interaction with all of the others each 
repetition highlights both the differential and the contextual elements in the 
production of meaning. In effect one could extend these observations to cover 
all the other repetitive and formulaic units in the Sutra.
In general, repetition may serve to reinforce an idea in the manner of catechistic 
instruction or to exhaust all the ‘pertinences’ of a subject by seeming, with small 
variations, to cover all of its aspects.11 In the Sutra it is clear that neither of these 
functions is relevant. On the contrary its form is designed as a kind of repetitive 
meditation which functions, as Conze noted in relation to the Large Sutra on 
Perfect Wisdom, ‘to bring about a certain state of mind, and not merely to 
convince the intellect’.12 By frustrating any absolute identification with the 
‘content’ of any particular unit, repetition serves to block the extraction of 
categorical ‘truths’ from the Sutra (it engenders the Bodhisattva mind which, 
as the Sutra puts it, ‘alights upon no thing whatsoever’13). In effect the frag­
mentary repetitive structure inhibits the reader’s desire to insert himself into 
(or represent himself in) the text by committing himself to its standpoints, whether 
these be at the moral or intellectual or anagogical (world-view) levels. In so far 
as the Sutra neither explicitly judges (it develops no systematic categories of 
moral exclusion) nor constructs propositions nor presents a metaphysical world­
view it sharpens the awareness of the potential of language to do precisely these 
things by depriving the reader of a position in the text as the subject of assent to 
such standpoints.
11 Roland Barthes, Sade Fourier Loyola, trans. Richard Miller (London: Jonathan 
Cape, 1977), p. 60.
12 Conze, The Large Sutra on Perfect Wisdom, p. 5.
13 This phrase which is particularly suited to the present context is taken from the 
translation of the Sutra by A. F. Price and Wong Mou-Lam (Berkeley: Shambhala 
Publications, 1975), p. 37.
We may note finally the curious structure of interlocution (its organization as 
a sequence of questions and answers) of the Sutra. It is remarkable that the 
initial hierarchical donor (the Buddha)/receiver (Subhuti) roles established at 
the outset in which Subhuti asks for instruction and the Buddha promises to 
give it are not strictly adhered to. Instead the roles are constantly interchanged 
and reversed, the Buddha sometimes asking the questions and Subhuti replying, 
sometimes the Buddha being questioned by Subhuti and offering replies. In this 
way the absolute discrimination implicit in the donor/receiver or response/ 
demand roles is overcome through these reciprocal exchanges, and the concep­
tion of a finalized ‘truth-gift’ bestowed by donor on seeker is transcended. 




2. The Referential Illusion
I use the term ‘referential’ here to denote not only the belief in the identity of 
the signified with the referent but also the tendency of the signifier (sound-image) 
to sweep on ‘beyond the signified towards the pure materiality of the referent’.14 
The realistic illusion is generated precisely by this bypassing of the signified 
through which the impression of a natural bond between word-sound and 
object is established. Through their rhetorical strategies certain sections of the 
Sutra work to undermine this impression; they create contexts in which the 
referent is destabilized and made finally inaccessible to the reader.
14 Barthes, Sade Fourier Loyola, p. 62.
The Sutra opens deceptively with language called on to authenticate a particu­
lar historical occasion (in the traditional manner of Sutras). Initially a sequence 
of ‘realistic effects’ serves primarily to reinforce the referential illusion, the 
capacity of language to transcribe a ‘real’ place and event. Thus the exact loca­
tion of the park where the Buddha sojourned is specified, the precise number of 
monks, the manner of his visit to Shravasti to beg and of his washing and sitting 
down to eat and of his initiating the discourse (SI). Even the pronoun ‘I’ 
(presumed to denote Ananda) functions as an authentication of personal presence 
and witness (these ‘realistic effects’ are themselves compromised by their overtly 
fictional status, the Sutra being written seven or eight centuries after the death 
of the Buddha and Ananda). The description of Subhuti’s mode of address to 
the Buddha is the last instance of this mimetic employment of language to 
represent ‘real events’ in the Sutra.
What Nagarjuna demonstrated through his use of the negative dialectic, the 
Sutra enacts through its rhetorical strategies: that words take on meaning from 
their relationship to other words in the system and not from any intrinsic 
relationship to extra-linguistic entities. I choose for discussion one out of half 
a dozen similar sections which appear at first sight to operate referentially; Sil 
goes as follows:
The Lord asked: What do you think, Subhuti, if there were as many 
Ganges rivers as there are grains of sand in the large river Ganges, would the 
grains of sand in them be many?—Subhuti replied: Those Ganges rivers 
would indeed be many, much more so the grains of sand in them.—The 
Lord said: This is what I announce to you, Subhuti, this is what I make 
known to you,—if some woman or man had filled with the seven precious 
things as many world systems as there are grains of sand in those Ganges 
rivers, and would give them as a gift to the Tathagatas, Arhats, fully 
Enlightened Ones—what do you think, Subhuti, would that woman or 
man on the strength of that beget a great heap of merit?
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Even though these references to the Ganges river and to its sand-grains have a 
certain conventional status, in effect they serve to fracture the sense of a natural 
fidelity between word-image and referent. For example the literal river-image 
is so multiplied and transposed as to form one mere link in a chain of perspectives 
which stretches to vanishing point. Whatever claim to a referential validity the 
image-complex sand-grains/rivers/world systems initially possessed is subsumed 
in a dizzying multiplication of indices which obliterates any imaginable relation­
ship of the words to an objective reality. This technique of vertiginous hyperbolic 
expansion is repeated in a variety of spatio-temporal contexts throughout the 
Sutra.
Thus the term ‘Ganges river’ is clearly not some object represented by lan­
guage but purely a means of signification, one of a ‘galaxy of signifiers’ which 
connote nothing but the absolute indeterminacy of their objects of reference. 
We are witnessing a language-game whose primary goal is to suspend the 
referent and to set up a chain of reactions among a network of signifiers (other 
sections show language stretched to its extreme limits of spatio-temporal 
representation, thus highlighting these categories as mental constructions with 
no existence outside the linguistic signs that produce them). The cumulative 
effect of these sections is to transform the impossibilities of the referent into the 
impossibilities of the discourse itself15 in which the signifieds seem to slide and 
evaporate beyond any capacity of the signifiers to stabilize or arrest them.
15 Barthes, Sade Fourier Loyola, p. 36. It is worth recording that Conze’s com­
mentary on one of these vertiginous spatio-cosmological trips in the Sutra (S30: ‘this 
great world system of 1,000 million worlds’) replicates the operation of the section itself 
by substituting for the referential function of the words one of empty signification. 
Thus initially Conze experiences the ‘oppression’ of the referent, the despair at the 
‘senseless bulk’ of matter and the concomitant ‘nightmare of meaninglessness’, an 
oppression, however, dissipated by perceiving the words as empty signifiers, and thus 
the world-system as ‘no-system’. There is ‘no bulk of matter at all, but only thoughts 
and words’ in our minds (p. 65).
In the context of gift-giving the Sutra declares that the Bodhisattva should 
not be ‘supported by sight-objects, nor by sounds, smells, tastes, touchables, 
or mind-objects’; not even by the ‘notion of a sign’ (S4). In an analogous manner 
these sections of the Sutra show language as ‘unsupported’, as empty of those 
entities which in its conventional usage it is supposed to reflect. In so doing they 
expose the ‘absent’ dimension of language, that ontological voidness or lack which 
the play of signification in its power to make what is absent seem present to 
consciousness seeks to conceal. In indicating this lack they also expose the roots 
of those movements of desire (which are also movements of language) for those 
absent objects through which the dialectical interplay between need and demand 
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is perpetuated. In the soteriological sense the greed for names, and by extension 
for the objects they represent, is cut off, so to speak, at the roots.
3. The Semantic Illusion
In a wide variety of contexts the Sutra declares that the ‘view of a self, . . . the 
view of a being, the view of a living soul, the view of a person’ is a ‘no-view’, 
and that therefore by way of conventional linguistic usage it may be called a 
‘view of a self’ (S31). The implication is that the ‘I’ of speech (the subject of 
enunciating) is a semantic and syntactic fiction, the designation of a subject which 
can be represented conventionally in language but which has neither self-sub- 
sistency nor ontological status; the self, like the language through which it is 
fabricated, is empty. The proposal is a radical one in so far as it touches on the 
semantic illusion, the belief in the necessary relationship between signifier and 
signified which produces stable meanings in language and the sense of a perma­
nent ego. Upon what assumptions is such a belief based?
The most important perhaps is that of the transparency of the signifier as sign 
which permits ‘the concept to present itself as what it is, referring to nothing 
other than its presence’.16 In this manner meaning becomes transparent to 
consciousness, the mode of its production is obscured, and the foundations of 
self-hood as present-to-itself are established. Thus the constitution of the self 
through division from itself, in the empty ‘space’ between signifier and signified, 
is repressed. The ego, as it were, withdraws its gaze from the process through 
which it was constituted. The Sutra operates precisely by focusing the gaze on 
this process.17
16 Jacques Derrida, Positions, trans. Alan Bass (London: The Athlone Press, 1981), 
p. 22. Derrida goes on to remark that there is ‘no subject who is agent, author and 
master of difference . . . the subject is constituted only in being divided from itself, in 
becoming space, in temporizing, in deferral . . .’ (pp. 28-29).
17 For an account which does full justice to the complexities of the process of ego­
formation, the construction and positioning of the subject in language, see Rosalind 
Coward and John Ellis, Language and Materialism (London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1977), especially Ch. 6.
It does so first of all through its ceaseless mobilization of its ‘view of a self’ 
through which the notion of the self-existence of self-hood is thrown into 
question, and through successive recontextualizations, effectively desubstantivized 
(it is unnecessary at this point to follow this distribution of units). The effect is 
to represent the structure (or view) of the self in ceaseless transition, in transit 
from context to context. In so doing the concept itself is decentred and its 
dependence on the unstable structures of language and context exposed. Thus 
the self is ‘displayed’, framed by a succession of contexts, perpetually different 
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from itself, inhabited by a ‘gap’ (or empty space) out of which the notion, not 
of a fixed subject, but of one in the process of formation is generated.
In addition the Sutra concentrates the gaze of the reader by locating him/her 
within each particular section in a position of acute self-contradiction (difference 
from himself) for which the text provides no resolution. The strategy turns on 
the formalized three-stage sequence, employed throughout the Sutra and 
contextualized in relation to selves, persons, marks, dharmas, etc.: this is A; 
this is no-A; therefore it is called A. For example a ‘view of self’ is presented; 
this ‘view’ is negated; then represented in the limited functional guise of a 
conventional figure of speech. In this way the text openly deconstructs its own 
declarations, violating the process of logic through which universal propositions 
are constructed, subverting the basic paradigms through which meaning in 
language is generated. Thus the reader is located at the point of a repeated 
division or split, at the axis of oscillation between modes of presence and 
absence (this is A; this is no-A), required to hold two contradictory views 
simultaneously in sight. He becomes the site of the active production of meaning 
and its simultaneous annulment, at that point of contradiction at which the 
mechanics of the fabrication of meaning come into view. It is (among other 
things) to this purely mechanical or functional aspect of the production of 
meaning in language that the third item (therefore it is called A) draws attention.
To sum up: one might say that the Sutra shows up the pretensions of language 
as a means of analysing or describing the world on the three central fronts that 
this essay has considered: by liberating the conception of form from expectations 
of an enclosed and enclosing order, of origins, middles and ends; by fracturing 
the link between the word and its referent, the traditional guarantee of its ‘truth’ 
or ‘reality’ value; and, most radically, by openly indicating the inadequacy 
of language to generate anything other than purely provisional and functional 
semantic systems. Soteriologically the Sutra persistently underscores the ontologi­
cal dimension of absence in language, that final lack of being which the persuasive 
force of its rhetorical and conceptual structures conventionally operates to 
conceal.
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